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 This special edition about contemporary entertainment media in Indonesia 
consists of four articles.1 Each focuses on different popular genres of entertainment on 
television and their associated commentaries, primarily in the print media. The 
authors examine different aspects of television production which has burgeoned since 
the economic crisis of the late 1990s. The topics range from popular Indonesian music 
programmes, through imported genres like talent quests, real life crime and 
supernatural reality TV, to travel programmes which represent Indonesia to 
Indonesians through foreign eyes. The articles all give a sense of the energy, vitality 
and openness of mass television broadcasting formats, although these are usually 
portrayed in the mass communications and media studies’ literature as either 
effectively determined by multinational corporations or else conventional to the point 
of sterility. As a collection, these pieces, with their stress on television as complex 
sets of situated practices, offer new ways of approaching one of Asia’s major media 
industries. 
 
First though, why devote a whole special issue of the Asian Journal of 
Communication to Indonesian popular entertainment television? Of the main Asian 
countries, Indonesia is among the least represented in English-language publications. 
Major collections claiming to offer coherent coverage of non-Western or Asian media 
routinely not only exclude Indonesia, the third most populous Asian country, but fail 
even to remark on the absence (for example Curran & Park; Erni & Chua 
respectively). The reasons are several. Part pertains to academic fashion, which in 
turn often rides on the coattails of political and economic priorities. So Asia easily 
becomes reducible to high-profile countries, usually India, China, Japan or possibly 
Korea. Part is to do with how many Asian scholars from different countries have 
received training in the West and so command the codes for acceptance by 
international English-language publications. Part is also due to the relative paucity, 
until recently, of western scholars working on Indonesian media.2 Specific historical 
and cultural considerations also come into play. Indonesia’s often rumbustious 
political history and repressive attitude to intellectuals has not always been clement to 
research and publication. Perhaps this is why Singapore, the home of the Asian 
Journal of Communication, has long felt uneasy about its vast neighbour and so has 
often pretended it did not really exist. In any event, I hope that this collection will 
help stimulate interest among scholars of Asian media. 
 
There are more positive reasons for discussing contemporary Indonesian mass 
media. Television has been inseparable from the project of national development ever 
since Indonesia was one of the first countries to launch a civilian satellite, Palapa, in 
1976 and to place a television set (car-battery-powered where necessary) in every 
village. The aim was to reach out across the vast and sprawling archipelago and to 
address – interpellate in Althusserian terms (1984) – the population, first as the 
                                                
1 The editors and contributors offer their special thanks to Philip Kitley, who reviewed the draft articles 
for publication. Philip’s contribution went well beyond the usual task of a referee and he made 
invaluable suggestions on all the articles, which have significantly improved the collection as a whole. 
I would also like to acknowledge the helpfulness and unflagging support of Professors Eddie Kuo and 
Ben Detember of AJC. 
2 Among the notable exceptions are David Hill, Philip Kitley and Krishna Sen. Fortunately there is now 
a generation of young scholars working on aspects of Indonesian media, some of whom are represented 
in this collection. 
masses or as citizens-in-development then, with the emergency of terrestrial and 
satellite commercial television in the 1990s, in various more differentiated ways, 
including notably as consumers (Kitley, 2000). Television was also vital in the New 
Order’s articulation of political, ethnic and other differences as ‘culture’, with each 
geographical region being identified by its distinctive dress-styles, performing and 
plastic arts, and so forth. However television, with radio and the internet, was also key 
to the downfall of President Suharto in 1998 (Sen & Hill, 2000). The abolition of the 
Ministry of Information and the relaxation of state censorship under Suharto’s 
successor, Habibie, ushered in a period of dynamism and expansion of media in 
general, and television in particular.  
 
Although print media, together with largely decentralized and sometimes radical 
radio, are important for understanding contemporary Indonesia, it is television which 
preoccupies the Indonesian political classes and which most viewers consider their 
main source of information. However, television audiences, reared on the propaganda 
of the New Order régime, and familiar with the rhetorical devices of local popular 
theatre and literature, are often remarkably skilled at the critical interpretation of 
broadcasting. In order to attract advertising revenue and to fill broadcasting time, 
most television comprises what we would broadly call entertainment. Accurate 
figures are not available,3 but it is generally assumed that most of the population of 
some 245 million can access and watch television. So the Indonesian market is 
potentially large. However it is differentiated in cross-cutting ways by age, class, 
ethnicity, political affiliation and religion.4 So the search by the commercial channels 
for formats which will attract such a heterogeneous viewing population, which now 
tends quickly to tire of the latest fashion, leads at once to experimentation and 
adaptation of foreign genres, and to the unabashed imitation of locally successful 
programmes until audiences get bored. State television, which is still subject to 
various government guidelines on content, languishes accordingly. For the last thirty 
years, television has been inextricably intertwined with nation-building and with 
attempts to create an embracing and hegemonic vision of a single people, sharing a 
kaleidoscopic culture from Sabang in Aceh to Merauke in West Papua. To study 




Culturalist approaches to Indonesian media 
 
As the stress upon how Indonesians engage with television suggests, this 
collection adopts a broadly culturalist approach. Although they come from different 
disciplinary backgrounds – cultural anthropology, critical cultural and media studies, 
ethnomusicology and religious studies – as specialists in different aspects of 
Indonesia, the contributors all recognize how distinctive cultural understandings affect 
Indonesian programme production, distribution and reception. Certain processes of 
broadcasting as an industry are obviously similar to other Asian countries. If not 
always the content then certainly the inflection of programming, how television is 
implicated in viewers’ lives, and the public discussion and broader social implications 
of broadcasting are far more distinct to Indonesia. Political economic or mass 
                                                
3 ACNielsen sample of nine major cities in 2005 showed over 92% of people watched television. 
4 How many major different ‘cultures’ and languages Indonesia has depends on how you define them. 
Most estimates exceed at least 300. 
communications approaches to television, for instance, would have difficulty 
addressing the cultural factors which determine programming content (Barkin), how 
imported talent contests engage audiences (Coutas), the penchant for supernatural 
reality TV (Hobart), still less the success of local dangdut music as a challenge to 
contemporary pop music (Weintraub). 
 
This collection, however, is not primarily concerned with the long-running debate 
as to the relative merits of quantitative as against qualitative approaches in media 
studies. Indeed the terms of this debate may well be misconceived (Hobart, 2006, p 
499). Our concern is more constructive. It is to show how culturally sensitive analyses 
can enrich media and communications studies. Such an approach has wider ethical 
and political implications. Political-economic and mass communications schools take 
it for granted that the theories and methods developed in European and American 
universities are sufficient effectively to explain relevant media and communications 
processes without reference to the practices and understandings of producers, 
audiences and commentators – here Indonesians. As Asians become major world 
producers of film and television, new styles of production, working practices, 
aesthetics and commentary by media professionals and intellectuals on film and 
media themselves have emerged, which require recognition if we are genuinely to 
address the implications of the post-colonialist critique. 
 
 
Why Entertainment television? 
 
Entertainment television is often considered frivolous and not worth study except 
as evidence of global media trends and how ideology is inculcated through popular 
programming.5 If we are to understand the political, social and cultural significance of 
television, surely we should be looking at serious genres, like news, current affairs, 
documentaries, political talk shows and development broadcasting. Is it not there that 
the nation is on display and opinion is formed and promulgated? This argument 
however is inadequate, because it rests upon questionable presuppositions about how 
media work, a consideration of which involves critical media theory.  
 
Several issues are of immediate relevance. Media and communications studies 
often ignore the fact that production and reception are not timeless activities, but have 
histories. Most accounts also presume that the meaning intended by the producers 
approximates what viewers understand. Not only does the evidence from 
ethnographic studies of viewers suggest otherwise, but the transmission model of 
communication is theoretically problematic in itself. These accounts involve 
unacknowledged assumptions about human nature and rationality. They also assume 
that objective processes are independent of the practices which constitute them and 
the situations in which they take place. Finally academics tend to give weight to 
issues and practices that are central to their own lives. So they focus on ‘serious’ 
programming as ‘text’ – consider the strange metaphor of ‘reading’ television. And 
                                                
5 Popular culture constitutes an ‘arena of consent and resistance… where hegemony arises, and where 
it is secured… [It is] one of the places where socialism might be constituted. That is why “popular 
culture” matters… Otherwise, to tell you the truth, I don't give a damn about it’ (Hall, 1981, pp 230-1, 
p 239, my parentheses). However the arguments about popular culture as an object of study are not 
immediately relevant here and have been rehearsed elsewhere (for example Fiske, 1989; McGuigan, 
1992). 
they have difficulty imagining how other people – most notably ‘the masses’ – might 
have quite different ideas and practices (see Baudrillard, 1983).  
 
Television viewing involves distinctive histories of practices and cultural 
understandings. After over twenty years of the state broadcasting rigidly controlled, 
highly conventionalized, anodyne and often evidently counter-factual or manipulated 
news and documentary (Kitley, 2000) – even by the standards of these highly 
formalized genres – audiences have become largely sceptical and critical. Current 
affairs and documentary are not a good route to understanding how people imagine 
and talk about themselves, if they are widely dismissed by viewers.6 In the heady days 
following Suharto’s resignation, political talk shows (which were conveniently cheap 
to broadcast) flourished as different scenarios of reform were aired. Three years later, 
as the problems of overturning long-entrenched networks of power and collusion 
became apparent, such programmes had all but disappeared. Indeed ‘serious’ news 
was being cut back in favour of more sensational fare like crime and the doings of 
celebrities. 
 
The assumption that serious or factual broadcasting is received seriously or 
factually presupposes some kind of equivalence, the preservation of essential 
meaning, between what the producers imagine programming to be about and how 
audiences in fact interpret and make use of what they watch. This myth is a necessary 
fiction of political communication. But it does not follow that media and 
communications specialists should concur. The conventional argument that underpins 
the consonance of meaning for producers and receivers is some version of the 
transmission model. This states that senders transmit messages which are received 
relatively intact by receivers; and potential miscommunication can be eliminated by 
repetition. The argument is as beguilingly appealing as it is wrong. For a start the 
proponents of the strong version, the mathematical theory of communication, 
explicitly warned against applying their model to social communication. Referring to 
the semantic problems of communication, that is the relation of how senders interpret 
messages as against receivers, Shannon warned 
this is a very deep and involved situation, even when one deals only with the 
relatively simpler problems of communicating through speech (Shannon and 
Weaver, 1949, p 4) 
In one of the founding texts of media studies, Stuart Hall (1980) argued against 
assuming the isomorphism of encoding and decoding television on the grounds that to 
do so ignored the relations of production and reception involved. However, the 
difficulties of knowing how audiences engage with the mass media are far more 
intractable than even Hall allowed, as his critique retains aspects of the 
presuppositions he sets out to question (Hobart, 2006). 
 
 Transmission models anticipate how large and heterogeneous populations engage 
with the mass media and so make all sorts of presuppositions about human nature. 
The risk is evident that élites, including academics, project onto the viewing public 
either a vision of how they imagine themselves or else the public as somehow lacking. 
                                                
6 The notable exception to this, at least between 2003-2005 when I studied local television stations in 
Java and Bali, was local news, which achieved the highest programme ratings (although television 
executives privately doubted their accuracy). A key reason seems to be that local news is fairly easily 
corroborated independently and so viewers learn how to incorporate stations’ biases. 
What distinguishes Indonesian television producers, as Barkin notes, is precisely that 
their backgrounds are quite different from their viewers’. So either television 
functions to bridge the gap – to mediate – between inadequate humanity and how they 
should ideally be, or television gives them what suits the executives. However the 
viewing masses are also prone to being misled, which is why entertainment media 
engender such an equivocal reaction among academics and political élites.7  
 
Two other sets of presuppositions are also widely implicated in mass 
communications approaches. The first takes it as unproblematic that media content is 
adequately described as texts containing messages which are – or should be – in what 
Basil Bernstein designated the ‘elaborated code’ used by the middle classes and 
ultimately propositional. As television is strongly visual and auditory, quite how 
images and music, which are so central to entertainment media are supposed to work 
is far less clear. The second is about rationality. There is confusion as to whether the 
notion of reason in analyses of the mass media is descriptive (describes what is the 
case), prescriptive (states what should be the case) or formal (outlines the conditions 
of intelligibility). Development media conventionally stress the second. The aim is to 
communicate the desirability of modernity to be achieved through rational 
development. It follows neither that how people engage with television can 
adequately be described using rationality nor that formal conditions are sufficient to 
delineate how media are understood and used.  
 
By contrast the contributors here are interested in the diversity of both producers 
and viewers, and in the variety of media-related practices which occur. Their concern 
is how both producers and viewers are differentiated by class, gender, ethnicity, age 
and other factors. They do not assume some pre-social homunculus which is the 
essential transmitter and recipient of the media (Henriquez et al., 1984 ). Instead the 
contributors work against a background of the practices of production (designing 
formats, meeting deadlines, positioning themselves within the industry) and readers’ 
and viewers’ practices (watching, reading, interpreting, commenting, and engaging or 
refusing to engage in different situations).  
 
Another problem involves preconceptions, partly shared it seems, by both the 
political classes and academics. Put simply, they tend to assume that, because 
something is important and serious to them, ipso facto it is to the rest of the 
population. Ideally programme content should inform and instruct. Although they 
may not be particularly interested, people ought to take politics and current affairs 
seriously. (What the viewing public actually do tune in and watch is the theme of 
several contributions here.) It is far from clear though that the realism implicit in such 
accounts adequately represents how the mass media work. Summing up research on 
news broadcasts, Fiske noted how news and current affairs are structured according to 
such highly conventional narrative codes that we are ‘justified in thinking of the news 
as masculine soap opera’ (1989, p 308 ) 
 
The key word here is ‘serious’, the antitheses of which are ‘frivolous’ or 
‘entertaining’ – the resonances of the dichotomy deriving, as Dyer has noted, from the 
distinction between labour and leisure. Entertainment 
                                                
7 There is an implicit Christian imagery of humanity as fallen. However other religions and political 
doctrines have alternative ways of constituting the masses as lacking. 
rejects the claims of morality, politics and aesthetics in a culture which still 
accords these high status. It is born of a society that both considers leisure 
and pleasure to be secondary and even inferior to the businesses of producing 
and reproducing, work and family, and yet invests much energy, desire and 
money into promoting them (Dyer, 1992a, p 2) 
In a functional analysis, leisure can be seen either as a way of compensating 
for the dreariness of work or else as the passivity attendant on industrial 
labour… But the richness and variety of actual forms of leisure suggest that 
leisure should also be seen as the creation of meaning in a world in which 
work and the daily round are characterized by drudgery, insistence and 
meaninglessness (Dyer, 1992, p 13) 
 
Dyer’s argument points to how the value-laden dichotomy between serious media 
and entertainment involves unacknowledged presuppositions about class interests in 
capitalist societies. It also offers a way out of the commonsensical idea that 
entertainment for the masses worldwide is adequately explained by recourse to an 
uncritical appeal to ‘escapism’. Morson (1995) has noted an unappreciated alternative 
to the narrative technique of foreshadowing. This is a device widely used in literature 
and media, in which future events are anticipated, so giving the narrative a sense of 
completeness and finality, which stands however in stark antithesis to lived 
experience. This alternative he designated as ‘sideshadowing’, which is the 
recognition that at each point in our lives there are many alternative possibilities, most 
of which remain unactualized. These sideshadows constitute the repertoire of 
narrative and for viewers the appreciation of other possibilities in human lives and 




The argument  
 
 Taken together, the articles in this collection offer an argument for the critical 
examination of the cultural practices which constitute Indonesian entertainment 
television. Gareth Barkin’s piece demonstrates the contribution anthropology can 
make to understanding processes of production. Drawing upon his ethnography of 
production houses and channels in Jakarta, he shows how the format, content and 
style of programming depend on issues of ‘intra-group prestige’ and ‘the internal, 
aesthetic politics of Jakarta’s “culture of production” and the sorts of forms, narratives 
and themes that resonate within it’. Starting with a pilot travel programme for 
TransTV, he examines how decisions have little to do with anticipating audience 
demand or interest, but reflect executives’ overseas education and their distinctively 
élite tastes affected by global media narratives. The result is that, in travel and many 
other genres, the subject position presented to viewers is often foreign. So Indonesian 
viewers are invited to adopt a ‘foreignizing gaze’ upon themselves, reified in travel 
                                                
8 Unfortunately, because of publication deadlines, we were not able to include an intriguing piece in 
preparation by Faruk from Universitas Gadjah Mada on the top-rated sit-com Bajaj Bajuri, set among 
the Jakarta underclass. Bajaj Bajuri creates worlds of possibility through a complex play of realism and 
aspiration. From the analysis of viewers’ commentaries, Faruk shows how viewers are reflexively 
aware that they are watching a genre historically positioned in relation to previous genres. He also 
explicates how a popular comedy offers a subtle commentary on representations of both class and 
realism in the Indonesian mass media.  
programmes as exotic and commoditized ‘culture’. Barkin’s article suggests the 
importance of ethnographic analyses of media production to complement political-
economic studies. 
 
 The other three articles examine issues around the popularity of the highest rated 
genres of programmes over the last few years: interactive singer-performer talent 
quests, crime and supernatural reality TV, and local dangdut music. Penny Coutas 
examines Indonesian imports of global brands, notably the tightly-regulated Idol 
format. She considers whether these support the cultural imperialism thesis, voiced in 
the Indonesian press, which argues that multinational corporations dominate high 
profile media production in developing countries. On audiences, Coutas notes that ‘in 
many respects…the real ‘consumers’ of Indonesian Idol are the advertisers 
themselves, whilst “the audience”…constitute the product’. And Idola Indonesia 
presents the West as ‘the “ideal” and participation in a global network of celebrity as 
being the ultimate accomplishment in the entertainment world’. However she notes 
there is much that economic and quantitative analyses cannot explain, from the 
cultural role of interactivity to the heterogeneity of audiences or how programmes are 
‘glocalized’. Coutas distinguishes ordinary viewers, who rarely vote, from supporters 
(pendukung) who participate actively and wield a degree of agency. Whatever the 
global parameters, Indonesian audiences use such programmes imaginatively to re-
think Indonesia, its place in the world and their own lives. 
 
 In my article, I examine two genres of reality TV, which have attracted high 
ratings and extensive criticism in the press from intellectuals and the political élite, 
namely real-life crime and supernatural reality programmes. These genres stand 
opposed to the disproportionate – and largely fantastic – representation of the upper 
middle classes in being about ‘ordinary people’. An analysis of the broadsheet debates 
however reiterates the gulf that Barkin also highlights between the Indonesian élite 
and the majority of the population. I consider whether these genres are conservative in 
that narratively they reassert social order against threats, or might constitute sites of 
potential resistance. As audiences come to television with cultural pre-understandings 
from Indonesian popular theatre and literature, I argue that such programmes open up 
possibilities undreamed of in cultural and media studies. 
 
 Andrew Weintraub explores the broadcasting history of popular hybrid music, 
dangdut. Dangdut was ‘associated with urban underclass audiences’ and depicted in 
popular print media as ‘backward, hickish, and unsophisticated’. As new recording 
and broadcasting technologies disseminated dangdut, intellectuals represented it by 
contrast to western pop not only as the music of Indonesians, but also through 
dangdut ‘“the people” could be harnessed for their sheer numbers in imagining a 
national culture’. In so doing however, the masses ‘receded even further from 
representation’. Beyond official enunciations about the masses, ‘however, lies the 
wild exuberance and pleasure of dangdut’, moments where the antagonisms of 
nostalgia for the past and rampant commercialism, between classes, and of political 
representation are worked out. So popular music, the raucous epitome of 
entertainment, emerges as perhaps more revelatory than are the texts of the political 
and intellectual élite about the intricate discourse in which Indonesians participate 
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